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Analysis of Smartphone Traffic
NICHOLAS RUFFING
ABSTRACT
Smartphone reconnaissance, the first step to launch security attacks on a target
smartphone, enables an adversary to tailor attacks by exploiting the known vulner-
abilities of the target system. We investigate smartphone OS identification with
encrypted traffic in this paper. Four identification algorithms based on the spectral
analysis of the encrypted traffic are proposed. The identification algorithms are de-
signed for high identification accuracy by removing noise frequency components and
for high efficiency in terms of computation complexity. We evaluate the identification
algorithms with smartphone traffic collected over three months. The experimental
results show that the algorithms can identify the smartphone OS accurately. The
identification accuracy can reach 100% with only 30 seconds of smartphone traffic.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
This paper studies the identification of operating systems (OS) of smartphones
that communicate using encrypted traffic. Smartphones have become the central
communication and computing devices in our daily life because of (a) their nearly
ubiquitous Internet access through various communication capabilities such as WiFi,
3G, or even 4G networks, (b) their user-friendly interfaces supporting touch and ges-
ture based input, and (c) their numerous applications and games. With the increasing
reliance on smartphones, users are increasingly using them to share sensitive data,
such as personal contacts and banking information. Smartphones are also adopted
in business and military environments [9] because of their portability and constant
network access. As a result, smartphone security is of great importance nowadays.
In order to launch an effective attack on a particular smartphone an attacker
must be able to tailor the attack to the target smartphone’s platform (i.e. OS). This is
turn requires that the attacker be able to identify the operating system running on the
1
2target smartphone. Once the attacker knows the target OS, he or she becomes able to
exploit known vulnerabilities both of the smartphone OS and of the applications and
services running on the OS. The most readily obtainable information that enables OS
identification is the wireless traffic generated by the target smartphone. Since more
and more smartphone traffic is encrypted to protect the confidentiality of the wireless
communications [7], the OS identification must not rely on the content of packets or
packet headers.
The ability to identify smartphone OSes has many applications, some of which
are malicious in nature while others are not: (1) As a smartphone owner or a smart-
phone defense designer, we would like to know how susceptible a particular OS plat-
form is to identification based on encrypted traffic. (2) The OS identification can
enable content providers, including websites, to tailor the content for different ap-
plications running on smartphones in different OSes. (3) The OS identification in
conjunction with application identification enables network operators, especially mo-
bile network operators, to predict the bandwidth requirements from a smartphone so
that the network operators can better allocate resources to match expected bandwidth
requirements.
When the traffic is encrypted, the observer can not access packet content, and
his or her ability to monitor the traffic is limited to the timing of the packets. Obser-
vations indicate, however, that different OSes cause the smartphone to generate traffic
with different timing. Differences in timing footprints are caused by differences in OS
implementations (e.g. CPU scheduling, TCP/IP protocol stack), and by differences
in resource management (e.g. memory management or power management). Simi-
larly, differences in applications caused by the OS differences (e.g. audio/video codecs
available for multimedia communications) become visible in the timing footprint of
sent packets as well.
31.2 Contributions
In this paper we describe how differences in OSes can be identified by analyzing
the timing traces of the generated traffic in the frequency domain. Frequency domain
analysis is a classical tool to analyze temporal signals [18], including the timing be-
havior of traffic in our project, by converting signals from the time domain to the
frequency domain.
The main challenge in OS identification with the frequency analysis comes from
the fact that the frequency spectrum contains many noise frequency components, i.e.,
frequency components that are not caused by the OS features, but rather by appli-
cation or user behavior. The noise frequency components can be caused by network
dynamics (such as network congestion and round trip time), and traffic content (such
as periodicities in the video content when streaming a video clip). In this paper,
we call the frequency components that are helpful for OS identification, i.e., the fre-
quency components caused by OS features, the characteristic frequency components.
The effectiveness of any frequency-domain based identification clearly depends on its
ability to filter out noise and keep the characteristic frequency components.
Once the frequency spectrum of a device has been collected, it must be matched
against training data, that is the spectrum of interest needs to be matched with the
spectrum generated by a known smartphone OS. Correlation can be used for this
matching. The complexity of the matching is O(L) where L denotes the length of the
spectra. In this paper, we propose approaches to reduce the computational complexity
significantly and still identify smartphone OS accurately.
Our major contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose four smartphone OS identification algorithms. The identification
algorithms use frequency spectrum to capture the differences in smartphone
OSes. Correlation is used to match the spectrum of interest to the spectra
4generated by known smartphone OSes.
• We propose OS identifications algorithms that can remove noise frequency com-
ponents to improve the identification accuracy.
• We evaluated the OS identification algorithms with extensive empirical exper-
iments. The experiments with 336 GB of smartphone traffic collected over
3 months show that the OS identification algorithm can identify smartphone
OS with very high accuracy and only small amounts of smartphone traffic.
• We extend the OS identification algorithms to identify the applications run-
ning on smartphones. We applied the application identification algorithms to
identify popular applications available on smartphones in different OSes. The
experimental results show that high identification accuracy can be achieved with
as little as 30 seconds of smartphone traffic.
1.3 Organization
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews related work. The net-
work model and the threat model used in this paper are presented in Chapter III. We
explain the rationale behind the proposed identification approach and describe the
details of the smartphone OS identification algorithms in Chapter IV. In Chapter V,
we evaluate the smartphone OS identification algorithms with 336 GB of traffic data
collected over 3 months. The extension of the OS identification algorithms for applica-
tion identification is discussed in Chapter VI. We conclude the paper in Chapter VII
with a discussion of the future work.
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we review related work on existing OS fingerprinting ap-
proaches, reconnaissance through traffic analysis, and analysis of smartphone traffic.
2.1 OS Fingerprinting
Approaches to traffic based fingerprinting can be either passive or active. In
the former the observer monitors the traffic from the target, while in the latter the
observer may stimulate the target by sending requests and cause the target to display
a richer behavior for the observer to monitor. Most existing passive methods for
computer OS fingerprinting are based on packet headers. The methods discussed in
[16] detect the computer OS by checking the initial Time to Live (TTL) value in the
IP header and the TCP window size in the first TCP packet. Methods to identify
the computer OS by inspecting the application layer data in traffic, such as server
banners in HTTP, SSH, and FTP as well as HTTP client User-Agent strings are
also discussed in [16]. Kollmann [13] proposes to fingerprint the computer OS based
5
6on its implementation of the DHCP protocol, as different computer OSes support
different combinations of DHCP options. The network analysis tools siphone and
p0f developed as a part of the Honeynet Project [21] fingerprint the computer OS by
checking four TCP signatures. Two of them are the TTL and the TCP window size
as discussed in [16]. The two additional signatures are on the Don’t Fragment (DF)
bit and the Type of Service (ToS) bits.
Active OS fingerprinting methods to identify the OS of a remote machine are
used by Nmap [17], a software utility for network discovery and security auditing.
Nmap identifies the remote OS by sending TCP/IP probes and checking how the
remote machine responds to these probe packets. Based on the response, Nmap uses
its large database of heuristics to identify the OS. Another software package created
by Durumeric et al. [5], called Zmap, allows a single computer with a gigabit Ethernet
connection to scan the entire IPv4 address space in 45 minutes. This is a new tool
that can easily be used to establish active fingerprints very quickly.
Countermeasures have been proposed that are designed to defeat OS finger-
printing. Smart et al. [22] developed a TCP/IP stack fingerprint scrubber to defend
against active and passive OS fingerprinting attacks based on the TCP/IP stack.
The scrubber sanitizes packets from a group of hosts at both the network and trans-
port layers to block fingerprinting scans. These sanitized packets will not reveal OS
information.
All of the computer OS fingerprinting methods reviewed above require access to
the packet headers or packet content. As a result these methods are largely ineffective
when applied to encrypted traffic.
72.2 Reconnaissance through Packet-Content Ag-
nostic Traffic Analysis
Various reconnaissance approaches through packet-content agnostic traffic anal-
ysis have been proposed, and some of the approaches are studied in the context of
privacy breaches.
2.2.1 Website Fingerprinting
Herrmann et al. [11] developed a method for website fingerprinting with traffic
encrypted and anonymized by Tor. The method uses common text mining approaches
on frequency distributions of packet sizes. The method is reported to be capable of
identifying 300,000 real-world traffic traces with 97% accuracy using a sample of 775
sites. Panchenko et al. [20] showed the effectiveness of website fingerprinting attacks
on anonymity networks. Their approaches can increase the detection accuracy from
3% to 55% with a Tor data set and from 20% to 80% with a JAP data set. Their
experiments on a real-world data set can achieve an accuracy of 73%. The counter-
measure of applying camouflage to hamper the fingerprinting attack was proposed
in [20] and the countermeasure is able to decrease the accuracy to as low as 3%. A
website detection attack that could be executed from a remote location was proposed
in [8]. The attack first estimates the load inside a victim’s router queue by sending
regularly spaced probe packets and then measuring their round trip time. Based on
this estimation of the load, any of the website fingerprinting methods described above
can be used. Cai et al. [2] attempted to defeat countermeasures proposed for website
fingerprinting, more specifically HTTPOS and randomized pipelining over Tor. The
method used packet size vectors from encrypted traffic and the Damerau-Levenshtein
algorithm to detect which web pages the traffic is associated with. They were able to
8achieve website fingerprinting accuracy as high as 90% against some countermeasures
with a sample set of 100 websites. Early on, Liberatore and Levine [14] proposed traf-
fic analysis on encrypted HTTP streams to infer the source of a web page retrieved
in encrypted HTTP streams. A profile of each known website is created in advance.
The traffic analysis identifies the source by comparing observed traffic with estab-
lished profiles with classified algorithms. They used a sample size of 2,000 websites
with 400,000 traffic traces.
2.2.2 Inferring Users’ Online Activities Through Traffic Anal-
ysis
Zhang et al. [25] use short traces of encrypted traffic on IEEE 802.11 wireless
local area networks (WLAN) to infer activities of a specific user (e.g. web browsing,
file downloading, or video streaming). Their experiments include traffic traces from
web browsing, online chatting, online gaming, file downloading, and video conversa-
tions. They developed a learning hierarchical classification system to discover if web
activities were associated with a traffic trace. They performed their experiments in
a home environment, a university campus, and on a public network. They were able
to infer the users activities with 80% accuracy using 5 seconds of traffic and 90%
accuracy with 1 minute of traffic.
2.2.3 Hidden Services
Hidden services are used in anonymity networks like Tor to resist censorship
and attacks like a denial of service attack. Øverlier and Syverson [19] propose attacks
that reveal the location of a hidden server in the Tor network. Using one corrupt
Tor node they were able to locate a hidden server in minutes. They then proposed
changes to the Tor network in order to resist their attacks and these changes were
9implemented. A very similar effort in [1] investigates the flaws in the Tor network
and its hidden services. Three practical cases including a botnet with hidden services
for command and control channels, a hidden service used to sell drugs, and the Duck-
DuckGo search engine are used for evaluation. Their method involves first gaining
control of the descriptors of a hidden service and then performing a traffic correlation
attack on the hidden service. Zander and Murdoch [24] aim to improve their clock-
skew measurement technique for revealing hidden services. Their original method
[15] correlates clock-skew changes during times of high load. They noticed two areas
of noise, network jitter and timestamp quantization error, and aim to reduce the lat-
ter by synchronizing measurements to the clock ticks. They were able to reduce the
timestamp quantization error and increase their accuracy by two magnitudes.
2.3 Analysis of Smartphone Traffic
Smartphone traffic has been analyzed for various purposes. In [23] Tzagkarakis
et al. proposed to use the Singular Spectrum Analysis to characterize network load
in a large WLAN. This is beneficial to monitor the load and to place access points
accordingly. Their findings can help design large-scale WLAN’s that can be used by
smartphones in large public areas. Chen et al. [4] studied the network performance
of smartphones in a university-wide WLAN. They analyzed 2.9 TB of data collected
over three days and were able to gather interesting insights on TCP and application
behavior of smartphones and their effect on performance. Huang et al. [12] proposed
a methodology for comparing application performance based on 3G communications.
Their study shows how YouTube buffering techniques vary across smartphone OSes.
Throughout these experiments, the observer has access to header and payload
data. In comparison, our work is focusing on the analysis of encrypted traffic. To our
knowledge, we are describing in this paper the first work proposing traffic analysis of
10
encrypted traffic for smartphone OS identification.
CHAPTER III
NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL
3.1 Network Model
In this paper, our goal is to identify smartphone operation systems (OS) when
the smartphone communicates using encrypted traffic. The capability of OS iden-
tification is needed for various purposes: (1) On one hand, to launch attacks to a
smartphone, an attacker needs to determine first the OS and then the applications
running on the target smartphone. Given the OS and application information, attacks
can exploit known vulnerabilities to tailor attacks specific to the OS and the appli-
cations. On the other hand, to defend against the reconnaissance from the attackers,
smartphone defense designers and smartphone owners need to know how accurate the
identification can be. (2) The OS identification can enable content providers, includ-
ing websites, to tailor the content for different applications running on smartphones in
different OSes. (3) The OS identification allows mobile network operators to predict
the bandwidth requirements from any particular smartphone so that the network
operators can better allocate resources with the knowledge of expected bandwidth
11
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requirements.
We are particularly interested in the identification based on WiFi traffic for
three reasons: First, although current smartphones have various communication ca-
pabilities, such as WiFi, 3G, or even 4G, nearly every smartphone on the market is
capable of WiFi communication. Next, the majority of traffic from smartphones is
sent through WiFi [3] partly because of its low cost and relatively high bandwidth.
Finally, WiFi based passive attacks are easy to stage. A drive-by or walk-by detection
of the smartphone OS is therefore very easy to stage.
3.2 Threat Model
In this paper we assume a passive adversary who is able to capture packets
exchanged by the smartphone of interest. The smartphone, in turn, communicates
using encryption. This assumption reflects the increasing popularity of encryption
tools available for smartphones [10]. The traffic encryption disables access to packet
content and renders traffic analysis based on packet content ineffective.
In summary, we assume that the adversary has the following capabilities:
• The adversary is able to eavesdrop on WiFi communications from the target
smartphones and collect encrypted traffic for the identification.
• The adversary is able to collect traffic from known smartphone OSes and analyze
the traffic for future identification.
• We assume a passive adversary. That is, the adversary is not allowed to add,
delete, delay, or modify existing traffic for OS identification.
• The traffic traces including the traffic traces collected for training on known
smartphone OSes and the traffic traces of interest for identification by the adver-
13
sary are collected independently. In other words, the traffic traces are collected
in different network sessions and possibly on different WiFi networks.
Other attack scenarios can be very easily imagined. For example one where
the observer does not have access to the wireless link, but rather collects data on the
wired part of the path downstream. In this paper we focus on data collection on the
wireless link.
CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFYING SMARTPHONE
OPERATING SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we present approaches to identify smartphone operating sys-
tems based on the threat model described above. We begin this chapter with an
introduction of the rationale behind the identification approach. We then describe
the identification framework and the details of each identification algorithm.
4.1 Rationale
OS identification through encrypted traffic is possible because of implementation dif-
ferences and differing resource management policies among smartphone OSes. These
differences include:
• Differences in OS implementations: Different smartphone OSes may have differ-
ent kernels, different CPU scheduling algorithms, and different implementations
of the TCP/IP protocol stack. These differences in the OS implementations can
cause the timing behavior of traffic to differ from one smartphone OS to another.
14
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• Differences in Resource Control: Smartphones are resource-constrained devices.
Largely due to their small form factor, smartphones have limited CPU process-
ing capability, limited memory, and limited battery lifetime. To better utilize
these resources, smartphone OSes adopt a number of policies for resource con-
trol. For example, different smartphone OSes may have different power man-
agement policies.
• Differences in Applications: Because of the differences across OSes, the same ap-
plication for different smartphone OSes may be implemented differently. For ex-
ample, different OSes support different combinations of audio and video codecs
used for multimedia communications. Obviously, different codecs used for mul-
timedia communications will very likely generate network traffic differently. An-
other example is YouTube: In [12], iPhone is reported to first download a por-
tion of video at a high rate, pause a while, and then continue downloading.
The authors conjecture that this pattern is caused by the memory management
and power saving policy in Apple’s iOS. The Android phone reported in [12]
periodically downloads small chunks of YouTube video every 10 seconds. The
authors conjecture is that the download pattern is due to hedging against the
user not wanting to watch the entire video.
The differences described above will obviously give raise to different timing
behaviors for the traffic generated by different smartphone OSes. These differences
in the timing behavior can be easily captured in the frequency domain. A typical
spectrum of YouTube video streaming on the Android OS is shown in Figure 1: We
can observe that the YouTube traffic flow has many significant frequency components.
While some of these components are coincidental, others are associated with the
YouTube buffering strategy on the Android OS. Others again may be associated
with specific OS implementation approaches. To show the correspondence, we draw
16
the time domain signal of the YouTube traffic flow in Figure 2(a). We can easily
observe the periodic nature of the buffering in the figure. By checking the data, we
confirm that the periodic buffering happens every 250 seconds. For verification, we
zoom in the corresponding frequency range of Figure 1 and the zoomed-in portion
is shown in Figure 2(b). In Figure 2(b), we can observe the peak at the frequency
of 0.004Hz, which corresponds to the buffering period of 250 seconds. Obviously the
frequency component corresponding to the buffering is helpful in OS identification.
We call such frequency components characteristic frequency components. In Figure 1,
we observe a large number of noise frequency components as well, which in turn are
caused by network dynamics such as round trip time and the video content. These
noise frequency components are not caused by OS features, and they are therefore
not helpful for OS identification. Obviously, removing the noise frequency components
will very likely improve the identification accuracy.
4.2 Identification Framework
We propose four identification algorithms for OS identification. The four iden-
tification algorithms are designed under the same framework. So before introducing
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Figure 1: A sample frequency spectrum of YouTube streaming traffic on the Android
OS. To generate the spectrum 50 minutes of streaming traffic with an 8 ms sample
interval is used.
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Figure 2: Correspondence Between the periodicities in a Time Domain Signal and
the Characteristic Frequency Component in the spectrum
the details of each identification algorithms, we present the framework first.
The identification can be divided into two phases as shown in Figure 3: train-
ing phase and identification phase. The training phase consists of two steps: spectrum
generation and feature extraction. The two steps in the identification phase are spec-
trum generation and OS identification. We describe the details of each step below.
4.2.1 Spectrum Generation
The spectrum generation step converts traffic traces into frequency spectra.
The input of this step is a vector S = [s1, s2, · · · , sN ], where N is the number of
samples. The element si in the vector is calculated as follows:
Raw 
Traffic 
Traces
Spectrum 
Computation
Feature 
Extraction
OS Identification
Frequency 
Spectra
Extracted Features
Frequency 
Spectra
Final 
Detection 
Results
Training Phase
Identification Phase
Figure 3: Identification Framework Diagram
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si =
sum of bytes received during the ith sample interval
T
, (4.1)
where T is the length of sample intervals. The output of this step is the correspond-
ing frequency spectrum F S = [fS1 , f
S
2 , · · · , f
S
M ], where M denotes the length of the
spectrum. The spectrum F S is calculated in two steps. First we apply the Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT) to the vector S as follows:
yk =
N∑
j=1
sjω
(j−1)(k−1)
N , k = [1, 2, · · · ,M ] , (4.2)
where yk denotes the transform coefficients, ωN = e
−
2pii
N
1, and N denotes the number
of samples. The spectrum F S is calculated as below:
fSk = |yk|, k = [1, 2, · · · ,M ] (4.3)
where the operator | · | denotes the absolute value. Because of the symmetry of the
spectrum [18], we only use the single-sided spectrum, i.e., F S = [fS1 , f
S
2 , · · · , f
S
L ] where
L = ⌊M
2
⌋+ 1.
The spectrum generated in this step is fed to the feature extraction step in the
training phase or fed to the OS identification step in the identification phase.
4.2.2 Feature Extraction
The feature extraction step is designed to extract features in the frequency
spectra generated in the previous step for OS identification. The inputs to the step
are the frequency spectra of labeled traces that we use for training. The outputs are
the features that are selected for the identification step.
1We use i to denote the imaginary unit.
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4.2.3 OS Identification
The identification step identifies the OS based on two inputs: (1) F x, the
spectrum generated from the trace of interest, denoted as Trace x, and (2) the feature
selection from the feature extraction step in the training phase. The output will be
the identification result. The pseudo code of the OS identification step for each
identification algorithm can be found in the remainder of this chapter.
In all the four algorithms, the OS identification step will first apply the fea-
ture selection decided in the feature extraction step to F x, the spectrum generated
from the trace of interest. We denote the feature extracted spectrum as F ′x. The
selected spectral features of the test trace will be compared with the spectral fea-
tures in the labeled traces of each smartphone OS by correlation. In the following,
we denote the pth labeled trace of smartphone OS A as Ap, its spectrum as F
Ap ,
and its feature-extracted spectrum as F ′Ap . The correlation between the two feature-
extracted spectra F ′x and F ′Ap can be calculated as follows:
corr(F ′x, FAp) =
L∑
k=1
(f ′xk − F
′x)(f
′Ap
k − F
′Ap)√
L∑
k=1
(f ′xk − F
′x)2
L∑
k=1
(f
′Ap
k − F
′Ap)2
, (4.4)
where F ′x =
L∑
k=1
f ′x
k
L
and F ′Ap =
L∑
k=1
f
′Ap
k
L
.
The identification decision is made by comparing the average of the correlation
between F ′x, the feature-extracted spectrum of the test trace, and all the feature-
extracted spectra of labeled traces generated by the same smartphone OS. We denote
the average of the correlation between the trace x and the labeled traces generated
by smartphone OS A as corrA. If the average correlation corrA is the largest among
the average correlations between trace x and the labeled traces generated by any
smartphone OS, the identification step declares the Trace x to match smartphone OS
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A.
In the following we describe and compare four identification algorithms, which
we call full spectrum, spectrum selection, suppression, and hybrid. The framework
described above is used in designing all four identification algorithms proposed in this
paper: The spectrum generation step is the same in all four algorithms. The major
differences among the four identification algorithms are in how features are extracted
during training and how the extracted features are in turn used for identification.
4.3 Full Spectrum
Function 1: Feature Extraction (Full Spectrum)
Input: F p,q : The qth spectrum generated by the pth smartphone OS,
1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, where P and Q denote the number of
different smartphone OSes and the number of traces available for
each smartphone OS respectively
Output: F ′p,q : The qth feature-extracted spectrum of the pth
smartphone OS, 1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q
for p← 1 to P do
for q ← 1 to Q do
for k ← 1 to L− 1 do
f
′p,q
k = f
p,q
k+1;
// just remove the DC component from the spectrum,
L: Length of the spectra
end
end
end
The full spectrum identification algorithm includes all frequency components
except for the DC component as feature frequency components. We remove the DC
component because the DC component is largely determined by the average traffic
rate, which depends on the content in the traffic instead of the smartphone OS.
The spectrum generation step of the full spectrum identification algorithm is
the same as the step described in Section 4.2. The pseudo code of the feature extrac-
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Function 2: OS Identification (Full Spectrum)
Input: F ′p,q: Feature extracted spectrum of each labeled trace, F x:
spectrum of the test trace
Output: OStype: Smartphone OS Type
// remove the DC component from the spectrum F x
for k ← 1 to L− 1 do
f ′xk = f
x
k+1;
end
OStype = Decision(F ′p,q, F ′x);
Function 3: Decision
Input: F ′p,q: Feature extracted spectrum of each labeled trace, F ′x:
Feature extracted spectrum of the test trace
Output: OStype: Smartphone OS Type
// correlate the feature-extracted spectrum of the test trace
with the feature-extracted spectra of the labeled traces
for p← 1 to P do
for q ← 1 to Q do
Calculate corrp,q the correlation between F
′x and F ′p,q;
end
corrp=
Q∑
q=1
corrp,q
Q
;
// average correlation between F ′x and the
feature-extracted spectra of OS type p
end
Find the maximum corrk from the vector [corr1, corr2, · · · , corrP ];
// without loss of generality, we assume the maximum is corrk
in the vector
OStype = k;
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tion step and the OS identification step can be found in Function 1 and Function 2,
respectively.
4.4 Spectrum Selection
The spectrum selection identification algorithm is designed to improve the
identification performance by removing noise frequency components, which are not
helpful for OS identification, from the spectrum. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, a
traffic flow may have many frequency components. The frequency components include
characteristic frequency components, such as the frequency components caused by the
OS’s power management, as well as noise frequency components, such as the frequency
components caused by network round-trip time, network congestion, and other effects
caused by network dynamics. Obviously, removing the noise frequency components
can improve identification performance.
Ideally, each frequency component should be evaluated to decide whether it
is helpful for OS identification. But the computational cost is prohibitive because
of the large number of possible combinations. To make this approach practical, we
apply a genetic algorithm to decide which frequency components should be kept for
OS identification.
Whether a frequency component is helpful for OS identification is decided
during the training phase, based on the labeled traces. The feature extraction step
will first divide the labeled traces into two sets: SetA and SetB. Instead of exhaus-
tively searching over all the possible combinations of selected frequency components,
the step searches for the best combination of the selected frequency components by
formulating the search as an optimization problem. The objective function to be
optimized is the identification rate obtained by identifying the labeled traces in SetB.
The variables of the optimization problem are binary numbers and each of these bi-
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Function 4: Feature Extraction (Spectrum Selection)
Input: F p,q : The qth spectrum generated by the pth smartphone OS,
1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, where P and Q denote the number of
different smartphone OSes, the number of traces available for each
smartphone OS, and L: number of frequency components
Output: F ′p,q : The qth feature-extracted spectrum of the pth
smartphone OS, 1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, Bselected=[b1,b2,· · ·,bL]:
spectrum selection vector where the binary bit bi indicate
whether the ith frequency component is selected
Bselected = ga(fitfun, Seta, Setb);
// We use ga to represent any genetic algorithm and ga
accepts the definition of the fitness function fitfun and
outputs values of the variables (in our case the vector
Bselected) resulting the maximum of the fitness function.
The fitness function fitfun is defined in Function 5
foreach spectrum in the input do
for i← 1toL do
if Bi==1 then
include the ith frequency component in F p,q to the
feature-extracted spectrum F ′p,q;
end
// without loss of generality, we assume the spectrum
F p,q is being processed
end
end
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Function 5: Fitness Function (fitfun) (Spectrum Selection)
Input: Bselected = [b1, b2, · · ·,bL]: spectrum selection vector, SetA: one
set of labeled traces, SetB: one set of the remaining labeled traces
Output: RateIdentification: Identification Rate
foreach spectrum in SetA do
for i← 1toL do
if Bi==1 then
include the ith frequency component in F p,q to the
feature-extracted spectrum F ′p,q;
end
// without loss of generality, we assume the spectrum
F p,q is being processed
end
end
foreach spectrum in SetA do
include the corresponding feature-extracted spectrum into F ′Seta ;
end
success=0;
foreach spectrum F u,v in SetB do
OStype = OS IdentificationSpectrumSelection(F
′SetA , F u,v, Bselected);
if OStype == u then
success = success+ 1;
end
end
RateIdentification =
success
number of traces in SetB
;
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nary numbers indicates whether the corresponding frequency component is selected.
We represent the binary variables as a vector Bselected = [b1, b2, · · · , bL] where the
binary variable bi indicates whether the ith frequency component is selected. We use
a genetic algorithm to solve the optimization problem. In comparison with the ex-
haustive search, this approach is more efficient at the cost of possibly finding a local
maximum and so leading to a less effective identification.
The pseudo code of the feature extraction step in the spectrum selection al-
gorithm is shown in Function 4 and the pseudo code of the OS identification step is
shown in Function 6.
Function 6: OS Identification (Spectrum Selection)
Input: F ′p,q: Feature-extracted spectrum of each labeled trace, F x:
spectrum of the test trace, Bselected = [b1, b2, · · · , BL]: spectrum
selection vector
Output: OStype: Smartphone OS Type
for i← 1 to L do
if bi = 1 then
Include the ith frequency component in F x to the
feature-extracted spectrum F ′x;
end
end
OStype = Decision(F ′p,q, F ′x);
// The Decision function is defined in Function 3
4.5 Suppression
The cost of selecting the characteristic frequency components in the selection
algorithm is very high, and so we must find more efficient means for feature extrac-
tion. The suppression identification algorithm is designed to remove noise frequency
components based on two observations that can be made from the typical spectrum
shown in Figure 1: (1) Most frequency components in a spectrum are insignificant
(i.e. small in magnitude). (2) Most insignificant frequency components are noise fre-
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quency components. Based on the two observations, we design an algorithm (which
we call suppression algorithm) that suppresses insignificant frequency components
and leaves only significant frequency components for OS identification.
A key consideration in designing such an algorithm is the number of most
significant frequency components to keep for OS identification. To determine this
number, we analyze the distributions of the magnitude of all the frequency compo-
nents in a spectrum. A typical distribution is shown in Figure 4. We observe that (1)
the majority of the frequency components are insignificant and (2) the insignificant
components’ magnitude can be modeled as a Gaussian distribution.
Based on the observations described above, the number of significant frequency
components to keep, denoted byK, is determined by the distribution of the magnitude
of frequency components. For any given spectrum F i we first calculate the mean µi
and standard deviation σi of the distribution on the magnitude. We then set a
threshold corresponding to Ti = µi + 6σi making the probability of the magnitude
being larger than the threshold Ti to be about 2E-9 according to the property of
Gaussian distributions. In other words, the threshold Ti can filter out over 99% of
insignificant frequency components. With the threshold calculated for each trace, we
find the number of frequency components with magnitude larger than the threshold
in each trace. We set K, the number of significant frequency components to keep, to
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Figure 4: Magnitude Distribution of the Frequency Spectrum in Figure 1
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Function 7: Feature Selection (Suppression)
Input: F p,q : The qth spectrum generated by the pth smartphone OS,
1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, where P and Q denote the number of
different smartphone OSes and the number of traces available for
each smartphone OS
Output: F ′p,q :The qth feature-extracted spectrum of the pth smartphone
OS, 1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, K: the number of top K frequency
components to keep in feature-extracted spectra
foreach spectrum in the input do
Calculate mean µi and standard deviation σi of the magnitude of
frequency components;
// without loss of generality, we assume the ith trace is
being processed;
Ti=µi + 6σi
;
Set ki to be the number of frequency components with magnitude
larger than Ti;
end
K=
PQ∑
i=1
ki
PQ
;
// PQ: the number of labeled traces
foreach spectrum F p,q in the input do
The corresponding feature-extracted spectrum F ′p,q is formed by
keeping the top K significant frequency component and suppressing
the magnitude of the rest frequency components to zero;
end
Function 8: OS Identification (Suppression)
Input: F ′p,q: Feature extracted spectrum of each labeled trace, F x:
spectrum of the test trace, K: the number of top K frequency
components to keep in feature-extracted spectra
Output: OStype: Smartphone OS Type
Form the feature-extracted spectrum F ′x by keeping the top K significant
frequency components in F x and suppressing the magnitude of the rest
frequency components to zero;
OStype = Decision(F ′p,q, F ′x);
// The Decision function is defined in Function 3
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Function 9: Feature Extraction (Hybrid)
Input: F p,q : The qth spectrum generated by the pth smartphone OS
respectively, 1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, where P and Q denote the
number of different smartphone OSes and the number of traces
available for each smartphone OS respectively
Output: F ′p,q : The qth feature-extracted spectrum of the pth
smartphone OS, 1 ≤ p ≤ P , 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, Bselected=[b1, b2, · · · , bL]:
band selection vector where the binary bit bi indicates whether
the ith frequency component is selected, K: the number of top
K frequency components to keep in feature-extracted spectra
foreach spectrum in the input do
Calculate mean µi and standard deviation σi of the magnitude of
frequency components;
// without loss of generality, we assume the ith trace is
being processed
Ti=µi + 6σi;
Set ki to be the number of frequency components with magnitude
larger than Ti;
end
K=
PQ∑
i=1
ki
PQ
;
// PQ: the number of labeled traces
foreach spectrum F p,q in the input do
The corresponding intermediate spectrum F ′′p,q is formed by keeping
the top K significant frequency components and suppressing the
magnitude of the rest frequency components to zero;
end
Divide the intermediate spectra F ′′p,q of each smartphone OS into two sets
SetA and SetB;
Bselected=ga(fitfun, Seta, Setb);
// We use ga to represent any genetic algorithm and ga
accepts the definition of the fitness function fitfun and
outputs values of the variables (in our case the vector
Bselected) resulting the maximum of the fitness function.
The fitness function fitfun is defined in Function 5
foreach spectrum in the input do
for i← 1 to L do
if bi==1 then
include the ith frequency component in F p,q to the
feature-extracted spectrum F ′p,q;
end
// without loss of generality, we assume the spectrum
F p,q is being processed
end
end
29
Function 10: OS Identification (Hybrid)
Input: F ′p,q: Feature extracted spectrum of each labeled trace, F x:
spectrum of the test trace, K: the number of top K frequency
components to keep in feature-extracted spectra,
Bselected = [b1, b2, · · · , bL]: spectrum selection vector
Output: OStype: Smartphone OS Type
Form the intermediate spectrum F ′′x by keeping the top K significant
frequency component in F x and suppressing the magnitude of the rest
frequency components to zero;
for i← 1 to L do
if bi=1 then
Include the ith frequency component of spectrum F ′′x into F ′x;
end
end
OStype = Decision(F ′p,q, F ′x);
// The Decision function is defined in Function 3
be the average number of the frequency components with the magnitude larger than
the threshold in each trace.
The feature-extracted spectrum is formed by: (1) keeping the top K frequency
components and (2) suppress the magnitude of the rest frequency components to zero.
The pseudo code of the feature selection step in the suppression algorithm in shown
in Function 7 and the corresponding OS identification step is shown in Function 8.
4.6 Hybrid Algorithm
Finally, we describe an algorithm (which we call hybrid algorithm) that com-
bines the effectiveness of the spectrum selection algorithm with the efficiency of the
suppression algorithm described earlier. We observe that the suppression algorithm
keeps the significant frequency components (i.e. large components) for OS identifi-
cation. Some of the significant frequency components (such as the frequency compo-
nents caused by round-trip time) are extraneous to the OS operation and are therefore
not useful for smartphone OS identification. The hybrid algorithm removes those sig-
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nificant frequency components from the spectrum before proceeding to select the
characteristic frequency components.
The feature extraction step in the hybrid identification algorithm works as fol-
lows: First, as in the suppression algorithm, only the top K significant frequency
components in the spectrum F p,q are kept in the intermediate spectrum F ′′p,q. Then
the algorithm searches for the best combination of the remaining frequency compo-
nents with genetic algorithm. The final feature-extracted spectrum F ′p,q is formed
by applying the best selection on the intermediate spectrum F ′′p,q.The pseudo code
of the feature extraction step and the corresponding OS identification step are shown
in Function 9 and Function 10 respectively.
4.7 Comparison of the OS Identification Algorithms
In this section we proceed to compare the four OS identification algorithms
described above. The comparison is in terms of identification performance and com-
putational complexity.
As discussed above, the spectrum of any smartphone traffic contains both
characteristic frequency components and noise frequency components. To improve the
identification performance, we need to remove the noise frequency components as
much as possible. Among the proposed algorithms it is to be expected that the spec-
trum selection algorithm performs best since it largely relies on a search algorithm to
identify the most characteristic frequency components. The suppression algorithm fil-
ters out the noise frequency components following the heuristic that most insignificant
frequency components tend to be noise frequency components. The hybrid algorithm
aims to improve the performance of the suppression algorithm by removing the noise
frequency components that are significant. The full spectrum algorithm simply re-
moves the DC frequency component so most noise frequency components are left in
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Table I: Complexity of the Feature Extraction and Correlation in the Identification
Algorithms (P : Number of Different Smartphone OSes, Q: Number of labeled traces
available for each smartphone OS, K: Number of most significant frequency compo-
nents to keep, L: Length of Spectra)
Full Spectrum Spectrum Selection Suppression Hybrid
Feature Extraction O(PQ) Complexity of Genetic Algorithms O(PQ) Complexity of Genetic Algorithms
Correlation O(L) Dependent on Selection Results O(K) O(K)
the spectrum.
The identification performance advantages of the selection algorithm a come at
the cost of a significant increase in computational complexity, and the suppression and
hybrid algorithm both aim at reducing this cost. The four identification algorithms
differ in the feature extraction step and the OS identification step, while the other
two steps do not vary. In the following comparison we focus on the computational
complexity of these two steps.
A qualitative comparison of the complexity of the feature extraction step during
the training phase of the four algorithms is shown in Table I. The feature extraction
step in both the spectrum selection and the hybrid algorithm is most time-consuming
since it needs to use an optimization step (genetic algorithm in our case) to find
the best combination of frequency components for identification. The complexity of
feature extraction step in the full spectrum algorithm and the suppression algorithm
is much lower since the step in the full spectrum algorithm only needs to remove
the DC component from each spectrum and the suppression only needs to suppress
insignificant frequency components in each spectrum.
We also want to point out that the cost for feature extraction is only incurred
during the training phase. The complexity of the feature extraction step will not
affect the cost during operation.
The most time-consuming part of the OS identification step is the correlation.
The complexity of correlating two spectra is O(L) where L denotes the length of the
spectra. Thus, the complexity of the correlation in the suppression algorithm is much
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lower, since a suppressed spectrum can be represented by a sparse vector leading
to a correlation cost of O(K) when we keep the K most significant components.
The correlation in the hybrid algorithm is of the same complexity because of the
suppression in the hybrid algorithm. For the full spectrum algorithm, the complexity
of the correlation is O(L) since only the DC component is removed. The complexity
of the correlation in the spectrum selection algorithm depends on the selection result
and it is usually higher than the suppression and the hybrid algorithms.
CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this chapter, we evaluate the identification performance of the proposed
identification algorithms. The evaluation is based on 336 GB of smartphone traffic
collected over more than three months on different smartphone OSes.
5.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is shown in Figure 5. The smartphones with different
OSes are used to watch YouTube streaming video, download files with the HTTP
protocol, and make video calls with Skype. These three applications are selected for
our experiments because of their popularity and their availability on different smart-
phone OSes: (1) The three applications are among the most popular applications
according to the number of downloads shown in application stores. (2) We want to
avoid the applications that are only available on one specific smartphone OS. Because
if the OS-specific applications are chosen, then OS identification is equivalent to ap-
plication identification. The three applications are available on all the smartphone
33
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Table II: Specifications of Smartphones Used
Phone Operating System CPU RAM Internal Storage Battery
HTC Desire HD Android v2.3 1 GHz Scorpion 768 MB 1.5 GB 1230 mAh
iPhone 4S iOS 5 1 GHz Cortex-A9 Dual-Core 512 MB 16 GB 1432 mAh
Nokia Lumia N8 Symbian 3 680 MHz ARM 11 256 MB 16 GB 1200 mAh
Nokia Lumia 900 Windows Phone 7.5 1.4 GHz Scorpion 512 MB 16 GB 1830 mAh
OSes studied in the project. If multitasking is supported in a smartphone OS, we
also use the smartphone for video streaming, file downloading, and Skype video calls
at the same time. The wireless traffic from the smartphone is collected by an HP
dc7800 computer. The data collection is through a Linksys Compact Wireless USB
adapter (WUSB54GC) installed on the computer. The wireless access points used
in the experiments include both the wireless router in our research lab and wireless
access points managed by the university. 1
The smartphone OSes included in our experiments are Apple’s iOS, Google’s
Android OS, Windows Phone OS, and Nokia Symbian OS. According to the market
research by Gartner [6], these four smartphone OSes have taken 94.8% of the market
share in 2012 and Android OS is taking 69.7% of the market share. The smartphones
used in our experiments are listed in Table II. For each possible combination of the
smartphone OS and the application, at least 30 traffic traces of 50 minutes long are
collected.
1In a different scenario, the data-collecting machine may be monitoring the traffic on the wired
portion of the traffic path. The scenario chosen for our experiments is representative of a drive-by
or walk-by attack.
Internet
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Figure 5: Data Collection Setup
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5.2 Performance Metrics
The identification performance is measured with the following three perfor-
mance metrics: (1) identification rate defined as the ratio of successful identifications
to the number of attempts, (2) false negative rate defined as the proportion of traces
generated by smartphone OS, say Y, identified as traces generated by other smart-
phone OSes, and (3) false positive rate defined as the proportion of the traces gen-
erated by other smartphone OSes identified as traces generated by smartphone OS
Y.
False positive rate and false negative rate can provide more detailed perfor-
mance information than the identification rate since the false positive rate and false
negative rate are specific to each type of smartphone OS. On the other hand the
identification rate, averaged across all the smartphone OSes, can show us the overall
identification performance.
5.3 Length of Traffic Traces
Our first set of experiments focus on the length of the traffic traces used for OS
identification. The traffic used in OS identification includes YouTube video streaming
traffic, file downloading traffic, Skype traffic, and combined traffic. The combined
traffic is collected by running YouTube video streaming, file downloading, and Skype
video calls simultaneously on the OSes supporting multitasking. For brevity, we
call the four types of traffic YouTube Traffic, Download Traffic, Skype Traffic, and
Combined Traffic respectively in the rest of the paper.
The sample interval used in this set of experiments is of length 8ms. For
each type of traffic and each smartphone OS, we collected 30 traces. In this set of
experiments, we use 20 of the 30 traces as labeled traces and the remaining 10 traces
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Figure 6: Identification Performance with Traces of Different Length
as test traces. The experiment results are obtained with 1000 random combinations
of the 20 labeled traces and 10 test traces.
The experimental results of the four proposed identification algorithms are
shown in Figure 6.
Full Spectrum Identification Algorithm: From Figure 6(a), we can make the
following observations: (1) The highest identification rates with YouTube Traffic,
Table III: Application Resource Consumption (The consumption data is obtained by
running each application alone for 50 minutes on the devices. Since the Symbian OS
and the Windows phone do not have built-in monitoring tools, we do not collect the
data for the two OSes.)
Application (OS) Battery Consumption CPU Usage
YouTube (iOS) 10% 35%
Skype (iOS) 25% 40%
Download (iOS) 10% 15%
YouTube (Android) 19% 20%
Skype (Android) 50% 74%
Download (Android) 57% 36%
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Download Traffic, Skype Traffic, and Combined Traffic are 0.88, 0.98, 0.81, and 0.99
respectively. (2) Even with only 30 second traffic traces, the identification rates are
0.61, 0.53, 0.70, and 0.76 for YouTube traffic, download traffic, Skype traffic, and
combined traffic respectively. (3) In general, the identification rates increase with the
length of traces. (4) We can observe that the identification rates on combined traffic
are close to or slightly better than the identification rate on Skype traffic. The iden-
tification rates of combined traffic are higher than the rates of YouTube traffic and
download traffic. The reasons are as follows: (a) Combined traffic has more charac-
teristic frequency components for OS identification in comparison with single type of
traffic since combined traffic contains other types of traffic. (b) When a smartphone is
more heavily loaded because it is running multiple applications, the OS features such
as power saving mechanisms are more frequently used. (5) The identification rates for
Skype traffic are higher than the rates for the Download and YouTube traffic. The
differences are mainly because of the higher resource consumption, in terms of both
power consumption and CPU usage, by Skype as shown in Table III. A higher re-
source consumption leads to a higher chance that power saving features are triggered
by the OS, which in turn generates additional characteristic frequency components.
Suppression Identification Algorithm: The parameter K used in the identifi-
cation step of the suppression algorithm is determined based on the mean and the
standard deviation of the magnitude of frequency components as described in Func-
tion 7. If not specified, the parameter K will be chosen in the same way in the rest
of the paper.
Figure 6(b) shows the experimental results with the suppression algorithm.
From Figure 6(b), we can make the following observations: (1) The highest identifi-
cation rates with YouTube Traffic, Download Traffic, Skype Traffic, and Combined
Traffic are 0.81, 0.94, 0.69, and 0.81 respectively. (2) Even with only 30 second traf-
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fic traces, the identification rates are 0.51, 0.46, 0.42, and 0.5 for YouTube traffic,
download traffic, Skype traffic, and combined traffic respectively. (3) In general, the
identification rates increase with the length of traces. (4) We can also have similar
observations as in Figure 6(a) that the identification rates of the Skype traffic are
higher than the rates of the download and YouTube traffic.
Spectrum Selection Identification Algorithm: Figure 6(c) shows the identifi-
cation performance of the spectrum selection algorithm. We can observe that the
algorithm significantly improves the identification performance: (1) With 30 seconds
of traffic traces, the identification can reach .68, .67, .77, and 1 for YouTube traffic,
download traffic, Skype traffic, and combined traffic respectively. (2) When com-
paring with the full spectrum algorithm, the algorithm improves the identification
performance by 7%, 0%, 12%, and 1% for YouTube traffic, download traffic, Skype
traffic, and combined traffic respectively. When comparing with the suppression algo-
rithm, the improvements are 14%, 2%, 23%, and 19% for YouTube traffic, download
traffic, Skype traffic, and combined traffic respectively.
Hybrid Identification Algorithm: The experimental results of the hybrid algo-
rithm are shown in Figure 6(d). In comparison with the suppression algorithm, the
hybrid algorithm can achieve higher identification rates as shown in Figure 6(d). The
improvement is mainly because of the hybrid algorithm’s ability to filter out noise
frequency components using a genetic algorithm. But when compared with the spec-
trum selection algorithm, the identification rates of the hybrid algorithm are lower.
The performance differences are because of the assumption made in both the hybrid
algorithm and the suppression algorithm: most of the insignificant frequency com-
ponents are noise frequency components. Removing all the insignificant frequency
components means that some characteristic frequency components that are insignifi-
cant may also be removed.
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Figure 7: False Alarm Rates (Spectrum Selection Algorithm)
5 10 15 20 25
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Number of Labeled Traces
Id
en
tif
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 
 
YouTube
Skype
Download
Combination
(a) Full Spectrum
5 10 15 20 25
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Number of Labeled Traces
Id
en
tif
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 
 
YouTube
Skype
Download
Combination
(b) Suppression
5 10 15 20 25
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Number of Labeled Traces
Id
en
tif
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 
 
YouTube
Skype
Download
Combination
(c) Spectrum Selection
Figure 8: Identification Performance with Different Number of Labeled Traces
False Alarm Rates
To investigate the identification performance on each OS, we use false alarm
rates as the performance metrics. Figure 7 shows the false alarm rates of the OS
identification with the spectrum selection algorithm. Similar observations can be
made on the other identification algorithms.
From Figure 7, we observe that the false alarm rates decrease with the length
of traces. When the trace length approaches 15 minutes, the false alarm rates are
below 20%.
5.4 Number of Labeled Traces
The number of labeled traces can affect the identification performance. To
evaluate the effect, we vary the number of the labeled traces from five to 25 in this
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Figure 9: Identification Performance with Different Sample Intervals
set of experiments. The rest of the parameters used in the experiments are set as
follows: (1) The sample interval is set to be 8ms. (2) The length of traces used in the
experiments is 15 minutes.
Figure 8 shows the experimental results with different number of labeled traces.
The results show: (1) Even with five labeled traces, the identification of the spec-
trum selection algorithm can reach 1, 0.97, 0.72, and 0.73 with Combination, Skype,
YouTube, and Download Traffic respectively. (2) The identification rate increase
with the number of labeled traces. The results are compliant with our expectation
since more labeled traces can lead to better knowledge of the characteristic frequency
components.
5.5 Sample Interval
One of the critical parameters that will affect the identification performance
is the length of the sample interval. The effect of sampling is equivalent to low pass
filtering since the fluctuation within a sample interval is completely removed. The
sampling can be helpful for OS identification if the sampling filters out noise frequency
components. The sampling can also degrade the identification performance if the
sampling filters out characteristic frequency components.
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We vary the length of sample intervals from 8ms to 1024ms. The identification
performance of the full spectrum algorithm and the spectrum selection algorithm
is shown in Figure 9(a) and Figure 9(b) respectively. The figures show that the
best identification performance is achieved when the sample interval is short like
length 8ms for both identification algorithms. We can also observe the decrease of
the identification rate when the sample intervals becomes larger. The decrease is
simply because a large sample interval means less number of samples available for
OS identification. We also observe some fluctuation in both figures. We believe it is
because of the filtering effect of the sampling interval: If some characteristic frequency
components are filtered out, the identification rates may go down. If some noise
frequency components are filtered out due to the sample interval, the identification
performance can be improved. But in general, for spectrum selection algorithm, it
is better to use a small sample interval so that most frequency components are kept
and the spectrum selection algorithm can use a genetic algorithm to remove the noise
frequency components.
5.6 Number of Top Significant Frequency Compo-
nents Kept (Suppression Algorithm)
As discussed in Section 4.5, the key parameter of the suppression algorithm is
K, the number of most significant frequency components to keep for identification. In
the suppression algorithm, the parameterK is determined in the feature selection step
(Function 7) based on the mean and standard deviation of the magnitude of frequency
components in the spectra of the labeled traces. The parameter K calculated in the
feature selection step is then used in the OS identification step (Function 8) to identify
smartphone OSes.
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Figure 10: Number of Top Significant Frequency Components to Keep in the Sup-
pression Algorithm. K is determined in the feature selection step (Algorithm 7) based
on the mean and standard deviation of the magnitude of frequency components in
the spectra of the labeled traces.
In this set of experiments, we vary the parameter K used in the OS identifica-
tion step of the suppression algorithm. The value of K calculated based on the mean
and standard deviation is also included in the experiments.
Figure 10 shows the identification performance with different values for K. We
observe: (1) When the number of frequency components to keep is relatively small,
the identification rate is relatively low. It is because lots of significant frequency com-
ponents that can be helpful for identification are not selected. (2) Similarly, when
K becomes too large, the identification rate may drop as well. This is expected as
the number of noise frequency components that are considered as features grows. (3)
We also observe that when the number of frequency components to keep is calculated
based on the mean and the standard deviation as in Algorithm 7, the identification
rate is close to the maximum for YouTube and download traffic. For Skype and
combination traffic, the identification rates increase slightly after the number of fre-
quency components calculated based on the mean and standard deviation. We gather
that Function 7 effectively selects a set of frequency components to be retained and
so filters out the noise frequency components and keeps the characteristic frequency
components.
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In comparison with the identification performance of other algorithms shown
in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(c), the identification performance of the suppression al-
gorithm is very close to the performance of the full spectrum algorithm and worse
than the performance of the spectrum selection algorithm. The performance differ-
ences indicate that some characteristic frequency components may not be among the
most significant frequency components. But the heuristic that most characteristic
frequency components are significant frequency components works well since (1) the
suppression algorithm can greatly reduce the computational cost as described in Sec-
tion 4.7 in comparison with the full spectrum algorithm, and (2) the performance of
the suppression algorithm is similar to the full spectrum algorithm and comparable
to the performance of the spectrum selection algorithm.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
6.1 Application Identification
The algorithms proposed above for OS identification can be naturally extended
to identify applications running on a target device. Obviously, the application infor-
mation can be critical to an adversary planning security and privacy attacks to the
target device.
We use the spectrum selection algorithm to briefly illustrate how to apply the
techniques described earlier to the identification of applications. The algorithm itself
does not need to be modified in any way other than being trained on application-
generated traces rather than OS generated ones.
We apply the spectrum selection algorithm to detect applications using the
same traffic traces described in Chapter 5. The applications to be detected include
YouTube, Skype, and Downloading. Figure 11 shows the performance of the applica-
tion detection along with the false-positive and false-negative identification rates for
each application included in the experiment. According to Figure 11, the application
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Table IV: Empirical running times for the Full Spectrum, Suppression, Spectrum
Selection and Hybrid OS detection algorithms. 15 minutes of traffic with an 8 ms
sample interval is used to generate this data.
Training (Minute) Identification (Second)
YouTube Skype Download Combination YouTube Skype Download Combination
Full Spectrum 0 0 0 0 0.2636 0.1389 0.1397 0.0622
Suppression 0.0075 0.0048 0.0024 0.0014 0.2930 0.1715 0.1707 0.0820
Spectrum Selection 759.6 493.2 336.8 161.4 0.1390 0.0814 0.0836 0.0435
Hybrid 3396 529.3 1727 541.3 0.1118 0.0639 0.0817 0.0299
detection rate can reach 85% with 15 minutes of traffic traces. The results show
that the spectrum selection algorithm can successfully extract application-specific
frequency components for application detection.
6.2 Running Time
Table IV shows the empirical running time for training and identification for
all four algorithms. First it can be observed that each identification for all algorithms
takes less than 0.3 seconds. It means the attack is very efficient and feasible once
the training is finished. We can also observe that the time required for training
varies due to the complexity of the algorithm. The spectrum selection and hybrid
algorithms take more time for training because of the genetic algorithm used in the
two algorithms. The time required for training with the full spectrum algorithm is
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Figure 11: Application Identification Performance (Spectrum Selection). The appli-
cations to be detected are YouTube, Skype, and Downloading. The applications are
equally distributed making the random guess rate 33%.
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zero since no training is required. The full spectrum algorithm just removes the DC
component and uses the rest as characteristic frequency components.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this paper we present, evaluate, and compare a number of frequency-domain
analysis based algorithms in order to illustrate how susceptible smartphones are
against passive attacks that aim at inferring configuration parameters of a target
smartphone despite the phone using encrypted communication. Specifically, we show
how it is possible, based on relatively short measurements, to infer the OS of the
phone or the particular application that is running.
Our future work will focus on the countermeasures. One can envision a number
of possible countermeasures to this type of attack, some of which have been previously
used with varying success in other domains. For example, the OS can attempt to
mask its timing footprint by disturbing the timing of outgoing packets. This has to
be implemented very carefully, as previous results of traffic padding and batching in
the area of anonymous communication have shown. Perturbing the timing behavior
of outgoing packets has a number of effects on applications and interactions across
the network. For latency sensitive applications, for example, any perturbing of the
timing leads to a reduction of timing slack, which makes it the more difficult to satisfy
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end-to-end latency requirements. Similarly, it has been shown that perturbances of
timings on TCP packets can cause visible secondary timing footprints caused by
end-to-end TCP dynamics and so may be counter-productive.
A typical method to counter application detection based on traffic flows is to
aggregate the flows from multiple applications into a single flow. As a result, the
timing characteristics of the individual applications become much more difficult to
detect. In our previous work on anonymous communication we have been applying
blind-source separation techniques to separate traffic components and attribute them
to senders. In our current and future work, we are investigating how similar mech-
anisms can be applied to render OS and application identification effective despite
flow aggregations.
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